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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of skyscraper building cy-
cles in Manhattan from 1895 to 2004. We ﬁrst provide a simple model
of the market for tall buildings. Then we empirically estimate the de-
terminants of the time series of the number of skyscraper completions
and their average heights over the 110 year period. We estimate the
model under the assumption of rational expectations and myopic ex-
pectations, and ﬁnd that the myopic model provides a better ﬁto ft h e
data. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that several local and national variables
determine both the number of completions and the average height of
skyscrapers, including New York City area population; national em-
ployment in ﬁnance, insurance and real estate; building costs; access
to ﬁnancing; property tax rates and zoning regulations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D84, N61, N62, R11, R33
Key words: Skyscrapers, building cycles, building height, Manhat-
tan, myopic expectations, rational expectations
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11 Introduction
Skyscrapers have captured the public imagination since the ﬁrst one was
completed in Chicago in 1885. Manhattan soon took the lead in the race to
build the world’s tallest buildings; and ever since the late nineteenth century,
the Manhattan skyline has become, arguably, the key symbol of New York’s
economic might. As such, the existence and development of skyscrapers and
the skyline are inherently economic phenomena, and yet, surprisingly, little
work has been done to investigate the economic factors that have determined
this skyline.
This paper studies skyscraper building cycles in Manhattan from 1895 to
2004, focusing on two related variables: the number of completions, and the
average height of these completions. The factors that have determined the
decision about whether to build, and how tall to build, have varied over the
course the twentieth century. Skyscraper heights do not simply increase, on
average, each year. Rather the “optimal” height is determined by a host of
factors related to both the New York City and national economies, as well
as regulations on land usage and taxation.
To investigate these cycles, we ﬁrst provide a simple model of the market
for skyscrapers. Then we empirically estimate the determinants of the num-
ber of skyscraper completions and their average heights over the 110 year
period. Two versions of the model are estimated. The ﬁr s ti sd o n eu n d e rt h e
assumption of myopic expectations on the part of the builders; the second is
done on the assumption of rational expectations.
Most popular and academic accounts of skyscrapers (with the exception
of Willis, 1995) fail to make the important distinction between engineering
height and economic height. The technological capability and know-how to
construct very large buildings (engineering height) were essentially in place
by the 1880’s; however, the costs and beneﬁts of skyscraper development
(economic height) have varied dramatically over the years. In Manhattan, for
example, since 1895, there have been ﬁve major skyscraper building cycles.
Based on the data set (discussed below), the average duration of the ﬁrst
four cycles has been about 26 years (we are still in the 5th cycle), with the
average heights of completed skyscrapers varying accordingly.1 Table 1 lists
1While skyscraper cycles appear to have some similarities to overall building cycles in
Manhattan, they do appear to have distinct characteristics them make worthy of study
in their own right. This conclusion is based on a comparison of all new building permits
issues in Manhattan each year to the skyscraper completions (adjusted for building lags).
2the periods of these cycles.
Major Skyscraper Building Cycles in Manhattan
Cycle Period* # of Years Year of Peak
1 1894-1919 26 1915
2 1920-1945 26 1931
3 1946-1978 33 1971
4 1979-1997 19 1987
5 1998- - -
Avg. cycle length 26.0
Table 1: *Trough to trough. Source: Author’s calculatons based on data
aquired from emporis.com. See section 5 for the time series graph of com-
pletions and average heights.
For the purposes of this paper, we deﬁne a “skyscraper” as a building
that is 100 meters or taller, as determined by the international real estate
consulting ﬁrm Emporis.2 Clearly, over time, the deﬁnition of what consti-
tutes a “skyscraper” has changed, but since our motivation is understanding
the economic determinants of these buildings, and since they have been reg-
ularly built since 1895, we choose 100 meters as the cut-oﬀ point.3 Using
some relative measure to determine a skyscraper, such as the a building’s
deviation from the mean building height is too diﬃcult to measure over such
a long time span.
Skyscrapers are important buildings to study in their own right since they
are qualitatively diﬀerent than most type of structures. Skyscraper construc-
tion requires vast amounts of capital, both equity and loans; and to amass this
capital often requires that builder assemble a consortium of diﬀerent types
of investors, including banks, insurance companies and equity partners, both
Building permit data is available upon request.
2The measure of building height used here is structural height, and does not include
any additional antennae or decorative elements.
3The average number of ﬂoors for a 100 meter building is 30. In fact, we can predict




R2 =0 .76, # obs : 473
∗∗∗Stat. sig. at greater than 99%. Robust t-stats. below estimates.
3local and foreign. The knowledge and skills needed to construct skyscrapers
are very speciﬁc and complex. Approval from many city government agencies
is needed, including (but not limited to) the Department of Buildings, the
Department of Finance, and the Department of City Planning. Only a hand-
ful of builders (and their lawyers) have the arcane knowledge to negotiate
the city bureaucracy (See Jonnes (1981) and Salmans (1984), for example).
The engineering and architectural complexities involved with skyscraper con-
struction also requires the hiring and management of very speciﬁc building
talent (Sabbagh, 1989). The process of land assembly in Manhattan also
requires a very detailed set of skills, from both a legal and real estate point
of view. It because of these complexities and the large costs that skyscraper
construction in Manhattan is dominated by a small group of locally-based,
family-run companies (See, Samuels (1997) for example). Lastly, skyscrapers
are diﬀerent simply because they take so long from conception to completion;
this requires builders to be forward-looking and develop expectations about
market conditions at a minimum three to ﬁve years down the road.
In addition to completions, height is also an important variable to study.4
The construction of tall buildings reﬂects the demand for dense oﬃce and
housing space, in a market where land costs are very expensive, and where
agglomeration economies are great. Relative land scarcity in Manhattan is
particularly severe since it is a long, but narrow island, and the 1811 gridplan
(discussed below) inadvertently put limits on the size of large building plots.
As a result, building height is relatively more important in the contribution
to total rental space than is the horizontal area. Adding extra height is a
way for developers to reap extra proﬁts and satisfy the demands of height
“consumers,” who demand height for the value and utility it brings.
Height provides highly prized views which provide greater utility (Benson
et al., 1998), and it is also an important symbol of status and power. Exec-
utives place their oﬃces on the top ﬂoors; penthouse apartments generally
have the most value, not only because of the views, but also because they
are a form of “conspicuous consumption”: only the very wealthiest can aﬀord
to pay for these great views and are therefore a grand demonstration of this
wealth (Veblen, 1899/1992).
Tall buildings confer status upon the builders themselves. And it is the
stories of these builders that have garnered much of the attention in the
4Barr (2007) looks at the determinants of height at the building level, the study here
focuses on completion and height cycles.
4skyscraper literature. Tall buildings are a form of “conspicuous production”
for the developers. In the early part of the twentieth century, for example,
there is the Woolworth building (1913), the Candler Building (1912), the
Chrysler Building (1930), and the Empire State building (1931). In later
part of the twentieth century, there is, for example, the Twin Towers (1973),
and Trump Tower (1983) and Trump World Tower (2001).
In addition, major corporations use skyscrapers as a location for their
headquarters, as a form of advertising, and as a means to signal economic
strength. Such buildings include the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Tower (1909), the Banker’s Trust Building Company Building (1912), the
RCA Victor Building at Rockefeller Center (1933) and more recently the
Time Warner Center (2004). These buildings often have the company’s logo
or name on the very top of the building. In addition, many buildings add
dramatic architectural elements to the top of buildings to heighten their
recognizability in the skyline, such as the “Chippendale” pediment for the
AT&T (now Sony) building (1984), and, the Chrysler Building, with its
famous stainless steel spire.
This paper is novel in several respects. To the best of my knowledge,
there has been no systematic economic study of the determinants of building
heights or completions over such a long period. Here, we take a long run view,
investigating buildings completed over the range of the entire 20th century.
Though there exists a fairly large literature on building cycles, these studies
generally look at the determinants of oﬃce or housing completions within
relatively short time period (at most over the course of 25 years); and they
do not focus on the determinants of building height. Furthermore, we present
a very detailed econometric account of the variables that aﬀect Manhattan’s
skyline in particular. Most real estate cycle models study an amalgam of
metropolitan regions or the national level, and thus, assume that many local
determinants of real estate construction are random and unrelated to the
included set of independent variables.
Here we include several variables that directly aﬀect the decisions of New
York City developers, such as a measure of Manhattan land values, the real
estate tax rate, and the presence or absence of zoning regulations or building
subsidies. Thus this paper contributes not only to the literature on real
estate cycles but also to the study of New York City directly. The Manhattan
skyline is perhaps the signature symbol New York City and, even the United
States, in general; the skyline is primarily an economic phenomenon, and, as
5such, requires economic investigations.5
The data set allows us to test several hypothesis about the nature of
skyscraper building. In the empirical section of the paper we compare so-
called myopic models to rational expectations models. The evidence in this
paper suggests a myopic model is a better ﬁto ft h ed a t a ,i nt e r m so fb o t h
the number of completions and the average height of these completions. This
ﬁnding is consistent with several studies on real estate cycles (Case and
Shiller, 1989; Clayton, 1996; Wheaton, 1999), since skyscrapers are very
expensive, complex, semi-irreversible projects that take several years from the
time of conception to the time that the ﬁrst tenants move in. Furthermore, we
compare equations before World War II to after, to see if there are structural
diﬀerences across the two periods. Lastly, we investigate the role that land
values play in skyscraper heights and completions.
Findings Here we give a preview of the major ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that
the regressions based on the myopic model provide a very good ﬁtw i t ht h e
number of completions each year. It is shown that national employment in
the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industries (F.I.R.E.), construction
costs, the net cumulative number of completed skyscrapers, average annual
NY Stock exchange volume, NYC area population, the growth in real estate
loans, and zoning laws are some of the major determinants of completions—
and all of these have the expected signs, as given by the model. We ﬁnd
some mild support that environmental “volatility” reduces completions, and
that the growth in the stock market is positively related to height. Real
interest rates appear, at best, to have a weak relationship to the number
of completions. There is also evidence that the presence of zoning laws has
reduced the number of completions. In general, these economic variables can
account for the major cyclical swings in New York skyscraper construction
over the course of the twentieth century.
In terms of the time series for the average heights, the estimated regres-
sions can account for much of the variation in year to year. Here we ﬁnd
mild evidence that F.I.R.E. employment is positively related to height. The
presence of zoning height regulations, as would be predicted, has reduced
height. In fact, we estimate that presence of zoning laws has reduced the
average building height by about 18%, on average.
5The attacks of September 11, 2001 clearly demonstrate the symbolic importance of
New York City’s skyline for both the city and the U.S.
6The ease with which developers can get real estate loans is positively and
signiﬁcantly related to height; while the real interest rate, however, does not
appear to aﬀect height. In addition, we use the equalized assessed value
of Manhattan land as a proxy for the market value for land in Manhattan.
We show that the growth in land values is an important determinant of
building height. This is something that we would expect, since conventional
wisdom says that there are often height “arms races” in certain districts of
Manhattan, in the sense that a tall building will increase property values
and will therefore increase the incentive to build taller to recoup the cost of
building on more expensive land.
In addition, via some trial and error, we can determine the lag lengths
for the important variables that determine completions and height. For the
two equations, we ﬁnd diﬀerent lag lengths, with relatively longer lengths
for the number of completions and shorter ones for the average heights. A
Chow test for a structural break after World War II indicates that for both
the number of completions and the heights, there was no major change after
the war, this is so, despite the various building subsidies have been oﬀered
in the post-War decades.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a
very brief review of the major economic and institutional factors that allowed
New York City to rise from a small, middling trading city to one of the most
important ﬁnancial and economic centers in the world. In addition, we review
the city’s major developments in the 20th century. Then section 3 reviews the
relevant literature on the economics of building cycles and building heights.
In section 4, we give a simple model for the market for height. Then in
section 5, we present the results of the time series regressions. Section 6 is
devoted to concluding remarks.
2 A Brief Economic History of New York
While a detailed treatment of New York’s economic history is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is because of the economic incentives that were created
by this history that skyscrapers rose in such numbers and with such heights.
We therefore brieﬂyl a yo u ts o m eo ft h em a j o rd e v e l o p m e n t st h a ta ﬀected
its growth and the evolution of its skyline.
New York City began as a small trading outpost of the Dutch West India
7Company (WIC) in 1624 (and received its ﬁrst corporate charter in 1625).
Inspired by Henry Hudson’s exploration of New York harbor and the Hudson
River in 1609, the Dutch West India Company, which in 1621 received a
monopoly on all Dutch trade in the Americas and West Africa, sought to
exploit the region’s natural resources by shipping furs, timber and surplus
farm produce back to the Netherlands.
In terms of Manhattan’s location and geography, it was centrally located
between Amsterdam, the headquarters of the WIC, and its ventures in the
Caribbean. The Hudson and the East rivers, which lead to the Long Island
Sound, allowed for easy access to the interior and other colonies to the north.
As Albion (1939) writes, “[A]t no oth e rs p o to nt h eN o r t hA t l a n t i cc o a s t
was there such a splendid harbor so favorably situated for a combination of
transatlantic, coastal and inland trade” (p. 17).
Ironically, the Dutch West India company found its New York investment
was a disappointment—unable to secure enough fur skins or timber to make
the venture proﬁtable. Over time the WIC eventually loosened restrictions
on private trading and on self-governance, and after 1647 “insisted that eco-
n o m i cf r e e d o mw a st h esine qua non of economic growth” (Kammen, 1975,
p. 57). Under the stewardship of Peter Stuyvesant, and until the English
took control of New Amsterdam in 1664, the city developed into a small, but
thriving merchant city, whose businessmen were able to exploit its central
location and great harbor. Under the English, New York City’s economy
evolved into a central location for ﬂour processing, and as a trading entrepot
between the Old World and the new one (Albion, 1939).
In the early part of the 19th century, New York City adopted three key
innovations that transformed it into the leading port and center of trade, as
well as the center of ﬁnancial capital. First was the introduction of regularly
scheduled packet service to Liverpool and Le Havre in 1818. With the inau-
guration of the Black Ball Line in New York City, a small shipping revolution
began. Ships were now pledged to sail at regularly scheduled times whether
full or not eliminating uncertainty for merchants, and therefore, lowering
their shipping costs and increasing the demand for their goods. As Albion
(1939) “[M]ore than anything else, the ocean packets contributed to the rise
of the port of New York” (p. 54).
Second was the insertion of New York City merchants into the lucrative
cotton trade between the south and Europe (i.e., the “Cotton Triangle”). As
the port of New York became the nation’s busiest port, New York’s merchant
economy grew accordingly. As such, New York merchants became a natural
8source of ﬁnancial credit for farmers and businessmen in the interior and
the south. Most importantly, was the ability of New York City merchants
in the 1820’s to insert themselves into the lucrative cotton trade between
the southern states and Europe. Using its leverage, New York merchants
provided Southern plantation owners with needed capital, but only on the
condition that ships ﬁlled with cotton sailing to Europe stopped at the port
of New York. Even as late as 1860, cotton was New York’s number one
export (Albion, 1939).
Lastly, the building of the Erie Canal, completed in 1821 revolutionized
New York’s economy. Once hailed as simply DeWitt Clinton’s “big ditch,”
the canal connected the Hudson river to Buﬀalo. It was an instant success,
dramatically reducing the time to ship goods and people between the newly
developing west and New York. The canal cemented New York’s central role
in U.S. commerce.
By the turn of the 19th century, it was clear to the city leaders that a
more rational city plan was needed to aid future growth. The small, curvy
street and lot patterns that developed from the Dutch days were ineﬃcient
and impractical. In 1807 a commission was formed to develop a street plan,
and in 1811, New York City implemented its now-famous gridplan, which
laid out wide avenues in a north-south direction and the narrower streets in
an east-west direction. In addition, lot sizes were standardized at 25 feet
wide by 100 feet deep, a size seen as adequate for early 19th century homes
and businesses (Spann, 1988).
The eﬀect of this grid plan was to dramatically aid economic development
by reducing uncertainty in real estate ownership, and by providing standard-
ization of lot sizes. However, the commissioners did not realize at the time
that they inadvertently created artiﬁcial land restrictions, because, by the
late nineteenth century, when tall buildings become more economically fea-
sible, large lot assemblages has become relatively diﬃcult, thus placing more
incentive on builders to build even taller (Willis, 1995).
After the Civil War, the United States economy began to change dramat-
ically. Technological innovation allowed for the rise of national industries,
which relied heavily on economies of scale (Chandler, 1977). Most famous
were the great railroad networks, the steel and oil industries. The rise of big
business generated the need for corporate oﬃces. Since New York City had
become the center of ﬁnance and commerce (a position further strengthened
by the Civil War), it naturally become the center of corporate headquarters,
including those of J. P. Morgan, Cornelius Vanderbilt, John Rockefeller, and
9Andrew Carnegie (Kessner, 2003). World War I, in addition, had the eﬀect
of removing London as the word’s center for ﬁnance and shifting it to New
York (Chernow, 2001). The rise of the oﬃce economy made Manhattan real
estate more valuable, which in turn, increased the incentives for developers
to build as tall as possible (Willis, 1995).6
With the rise of the oﬃce economy and the tremendous population growth
of New York City, there was a great demand for building space to house
oﬃces and residences. By the late 19th century, the technological capabilities
existed to supply this space, which needed to be in the form of highrise
buildings, given expensive land values and small lot sizes. Perhaps the two
most important innovations where the elevator (and safety break) and the
use of steel for building frames, which replace heavy, load-bearing masonry
(Landau and Condit, 1992).7
2.1 The Twentieth Century
By the early part of the twentieth century, the economic realities that created
the Manhattan skyline had also generated concerns that these buildings were
blocking valuable sun light of nearby buildings and casting shadows on the
streets (and generating too much traﬃc congestion), and therefore depressing
property values. The ﬁrst generation of skyscrapers were not subject to
any height or bulk regulations; and developers felt free to build very tall
buildings that maximized the total rentable space by using as much of the plot
area as possible (Willis, 1996). As a result of the emergence of skyscrapers,
starting in 1916, New York City implemented the ﬁrst comprehensive zoning
legislation that stated height and use regulations for all lots in the city. (See
Revell (1992) for more details about the zoning plan.)
T h ez o n i n gc o d ed i dn o tr e g u l a t eh e i g h tper se, but rather generated
setback requirements. Buildings, after reaching certain height, had to set
the building back on higher ﬂoors. The very top ﬂoors could be built as
high as the developer wanted, as long as the area of those ﬂoors were not
more than 25% of the area of the lot. The regulations generated the so-called
wedding cake style buildings, of the 1920’s and 1930’s.
6Another, oft-cited, reason for the popularity of skyscrapers in Manhattan is the ideal
bedrock formations that lie at or just-below the surface in downtown and midtown Man-
hattan (Landau and Condit, 1996). Barr (2007) explores this is hypothesis in more detail.
7New York permitted steel frame construction in 1887.
10After World War II, New York’s economy began to change. Decentraliza-
tion of the American population and business, as spurred by the automobile,
took its toll on New York City. In 1950, New York’s population was 7.89
million and had a murder rate of 3.73 murders per hundred thousand people.
By 1980, the New York City population was down to 7.07 million, and its
murder rate was up to 25.65 per hundred thousand people (U. S. Census,
1950; 1980; Monkkonen, 2001).8
With the ﬂight of population and manufacturing jobs and the decline
of the port of New York, New York City’s tax base was severely eroded.
In the face of these changing economic realities, New York City responded
by increasing welfare programs for the poor, middle class housing subsidies,
and the municipal payroll. To ﬁnance its operations, mayors resorted to
bonds to ﬁnance day-to-day operations. In 1975, with a national recession
as a catalyst, New York was ready to default on its bond payments (Adams,
1976). This ﬁnancial crises forced New York City to be subjected the New
York State Financial Control Board, which required balanced budgets from
then on.
In terms of zoning, by the late-1940’s, government oﬃcials and city plan-
ners felt that the 1916 zoning resolution needed a major overhaul to better
reﬂect the realities of post-War New York. In addition, it was felt by many
that the 1916 zoning resolution did little to curb excess density and conges-
tion. As a result, in 1961, New York City implemented a new zoning law.9
Like the 1916 resolution, building height was not restricted per se,r a t h e r
the new zoning resolution established limits on the so-called ﬂoor area ratio
(FAR). The FAR is a number that dictated the maximum amount of con-
structible building area for each square foot of lot size. A FAR of 10, for
example, means that for each additional square foot of lot size, a builder
can add an additional ten square feet to the building. The builder has the
prerogative about how to distribute this space between larger ﬂoor area or
building height. In addition, the code permitted FAR bonuses if a developer
provided a public plaza.
By the mid-1960s, however, highrise builders began to negotiate with the
8New York City’s population initially peaked in 1967 with 8.1 million people. The
murder rate peaked in 1990 at a rate of 30.66 per hundred thousand people (NYC Dept.
of Health Reports; Monkkonen, 2001).
9Under the 1916 zoning rules, the city would have been able to house a maximum
population of 55.6 million. The 1961 zoning code was designed to house a maximum of
12.3 million (Bennet, 1960).
11New York City Planning Commission to provide additional ﬂoors in exchange
for urban amenities, such as renovated subway stations. This led the City
Planning Commission to frequently amend the zoning codes. By the early,
1980’s, New York Times architecture critic Paul Goldberger wrote, “As far as
Manhattan skyscrapers are concerned, the 1961 ordinance has so frequently
been amended and altered—and even in special cases—put aside—that it has
almost ceased to exit” (Goldberger, 1981, p. B1).
One revision, for example, included, in 1982, the creation a special “Mid-
town” zoning district to encourage development on the west side of midtown,
which expired in 1988; this provision allowed FAR bonuses of up to 20%. The
provision, however, was also accompanied by restrictions on how much sun
light could be blocked by the top ﬂoors of the building, requiring that 75% of
the sky surrounding a new building remain open. In addition, since the early
1970’s builders have been allowed to purchase the “air rights” of adjacent
or nearby buildings. The purchase entitles the builder to add more ﬂoors,
and the seller is then prevented from constructing a taller building on the
property.
As a result of the city’s economic problems, starting in the 1970’s, a se-
ries of building-related subsidies were introduced to stimulate both business
and residential construction. In 1977, the Industrial and Commercial Incen-
tive Board (ICIB) was authorized to grant tax abatements to businesses if
they constructed oﬃces in New York City. The Board granted abatements
t os u c hc o m p a n i e sa sP h i l i pM o r r i sa n dA T & T .S t a r t i n gi n1 9 8 4 ,t h eB o a r d
was disbanded and the program became the Industrial and Commercial Pro-
gram (ICIP) which provided business subsidies “as of right,” if the business
satisﬁed a certain set of criteria. In the mid-1990s, the ICIP program was
curtailed in Manhattan, but mayors since then have negotiated tax abate-
ments directly with several companies, such as Bear Sterns and Conde Nast,
to build oﬃce space in Manhattan.
In terms of housing subsidies, in 1977, the “421-a” program was intro-
duced to provide tax abatements to building developers for constructing
apartments. For builders of rental units, the builder would qualify for the
subsidies if they agreed to charge rents within New York City’s rent sta-
bilization program. Developers of condominiums could also qualify for the
abatements, and the savings could then be passed to the purchasers. The
program was curtailed for most of Manhattan in 1985.
Over the years, despite the city’s problems, the demand for Manhattan
highrise buildings, both commercial and residential, has been great because
12agglomeration and New York’s central role in ﬁnance, marketing and com-
munications. These “pull” factors, have apparently been greater than the
“push” factors as New York has retained its place as the preeminent city in
the United States.10 In the last 15 years, New York’s economy has seen a
renaissance. Population has returned and surpassed its earlier heights; crime
levels are back to where they were in the 1950’s; city budget surpluses are
the norm; and new building construction has been brisk.
3 Related Literature
3.1 Early Work on Skyscrapers and Building Cycles
The last time that economists have studied skyscrapers in any signiﬁcant
detail was during the building boom of the late-1920s. At the time, the
focus of the discussion appears to have been centered around the debate
about whether the incredibly tall buildings being erected at the time (e.g.,
40 Wall Street, The Empire State Building, and the Chrysler Building) were
some how “freak“ buildings, built, not based on sound economic principles,
but rather based set on non-proﬁt maximizing motives (Clark and Kingston,
1930). The work of Clark and Kingston (1930) showed, for example, that
t h eh e i g h to fb u i l d i n g sa tt h et i m ew e r e ,i nf a c t ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t hp r o ﬁtm a x -
imization, given the rent levels, the value of land, and the cost of building
in the late-1920’s. They did not consider, however, any expectations about
future rent, when making their calculations on the optimal building height.
Work by Long (1936) investigated building cycles in Manhattan from
1865 to 1935. He computed the “major” cycles as deﬁned by Burns (1934)
and Kuznets (1930), as well as the “minor” ﬂuctuations. He found that the
median minor building cycle length was between four and six years, while the
two major cycles in his data set lasted, on average, 37 and 20 years, respec-
tively. Further he investigated the statistical relationship between building
construction and stock prices, the interest rate, industrial proﬁts, and “gen-
eral speculative psychology” (p. 190). Interestingly, he ﬁnds no relationship
between the interest rate on new mortgages and changes in construction.
Further, he concludes that building cycles and stock prices are “apparently
not very close” (p. 190). He writes, “All things considered, it is diﬃcult to
10See Carmody (1972) for a discussion of the costs and beneﬁts that ﬁrms faced when
deciding to remain in the Manhattan or move to the suburbs.
13escape the conclusions that the common causal factor aﬀect both building
and stock market prices is, in all likelihood, the element of speculative psy-
chology. Building projects in Manhattan are large unit aﬀairs, and therefore
are probably stimulated as much by the prospects of promotional gains as
by the possibilities of operating proﬁts” (p. 190).
Perhaps the classic work in the ﬁe l do nl a n dv a l u e sa n dl o n gb u i l d i n g
cycles is Hoyt (1933/2000), who detailed the value of Chicago land over 100
years. Hoyt documented roughly 18 year cycles, based primarily on the ebb
and ﬂow of population and business in Chicago. While he did not directly
address the nature of expectations, Hoyt demonstrated the repeated boom
and bust behavior of urban real estate cycles.
T h ew o r kh e r ef o c u s e so nt h el o n gb u i l d i n gc y c l e si nM a n h a t t a n . B e -
cause we have annual data and we are dealing with only the largest building
projects, we cannot focus on the minor cycles, though clearly there is much
year-to-year variation of completions within the major cycles. We also ac-
count for the “optimal height” of these buildings over the years, by looking
at the relative costs and beneﬁts of height. Unlike any previous studies, we
speciﬁcally employ econometric models that are able to account for the major
completions and height cycles. Since New York has been and continues to be
an integral part of the U.S. economy, we can measure the degree to which the
large cycles are aﬀected by both important local and national factors such
as population growth, supply of building and stock market activity.
3.2 Recent Work on Real Estate Cycles
I nt h el a s tt w e n t yy e a r s ,t h e r eh a sb e e nm u c hw o r ke x p l o r i n gt h en a t u r eo f
real estate cycles using standard supply and demand models. Much of the
literature focuses on the debate whether the real estate market is best cap-
tured by models of myopic or rational expectations. Another, more statistical
approach has used vector autoregressions to understand these cycles. In re-
gard to oﬃce construction, as well as residential construction, the empirical
evidence indicates that construction cycles appear to behave in a way that
is not compatible with builders having rational expectations, in the sense
deﬁned by Muth (1961).
Wheaton (1987), for example, investigates national oﬃce market cycles
from 1960 to 1986. He ﬁnds a cycle length of roughly 10 years, “a length too
long to be accounted for by realistic construction lags” (p. 282). Further he
ﬁnds the oﬃce market must remain soft or tight for several years before rents
14change, and supply or demand react. Further, he ﬁnds the supply side factors
are more responsive to rents than the demand side, helping to generate some
of the market instability.
Wheaton (1999) provides a model of supply and demand for building
construction to demonstrate how expectations about future prices can drive
price cycles. He compares two versions of the model: one with myopic expec-
tations and the other with rational expectations. His model demonstrates
that when market agents are rational and are able to forecast the results
(but not the timing) of market shocks, the rational model with building lags
can behave like the myopic model, but that the parameter values necessary
to generate the type of oscillations are “extreme enough to be considered
unrealistic. Thus clearly, the eﬀect of the induced historical ‘momentum’ in a
rational model is nowhere near as extreme as that generated by the ineﬃcient
pricing of the myopic model” (p. 227).
The work here also investigates the nature of expectations in the sky-
scraper market by testing the models implied by both myopic and rational
expectations. We specify a supply and demand model to generate equations
for the supply of both new buildings and the height of the buildings. Based
on the econometric models, skyscraper construction and height appear to be
consistent with a more myopic account of expectations.
McGough and Tsolacos (1999), for example, investigate oﬃce market
cycles from 1980-1997 in Great Britain using an unrestricted vector autore-
gression (VAR). Their VAR includes oﬃce construction (as measured by the
value of new oﬃce building expenditures), service sector output, employ-
ment in the banking-ﬁnance-insurance industry, oﬃce rents and short-term
interest rates. Tests for Granger causality show that rents and service sector
output both Granger cause oﬃce construction, while banking and ﬁnance
employment and real interest rates do not Granger cause oﬃce construction.
Their ﬁndings contrasts with the ﬁndings here. Oﬃce employment is found
to be an important determinant of oﬃce construction, though, we do not
have measures for oﬃce rents. The focus of VAR models, however, is gen-
erally on forecasting, rather than investigating the speciﬁce c o n o m i cf a c t o r s
that determine the market for real estate.
In recent years, there has been a series of papers that discusses the role
of options pricing theory in the decision to build oﬃce space (Titman, 1985,
Grenadier, 1995; Schwartz and Torous, 2004; Holland, et al., 2002.) One
common theme of this work is that the value of the option to build depends
on the level of building value uncertainty. An increase in uncertainty means
15that the value of vacant land will go up, and, therefore builders are less
likely to commit to development. However, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)
demonstrate that with investment lags (long delays to completions) and the
option to abandon the project before full completion (as is somewhat possible
with skyscrapers) will, in fact, reduce the incentives to delay the project, since
the opportunity cost of waiting increases with long lag times. Thus the net
eﬀect of uncertainty on skyscraper development is uncertain given the lag
time between project formation and completion.
In the vein of Holland, et al. (2002), a measure of “total uncertainty”
(or uncertainty with respect to rent values) is generated to test its eﬀect
on completions and height. As will be discussed below, since we don’t have
rent values, we use a proxy measure of economic activity that aﬀects rents
and look at how the standard deviation of this measure eﬀects completions
and height. For completions, uncertainty does appear to be negative, but
uncertainty does not appear to aﬀect height.
None of these works has discussed the determinants of building height,
and to the best of my knowledge there has been no recent work looking at
the economic determinants of building height or height cycles.
4 The Market for Skyscrapers
Here we present a simple model of the market for skyscrapers in order to
provide structure to the empirical analysis. A potential developer of a sky-
scraper faces the following proﬁt function:11










¢τ Pτ is per square foot value of the building at time t.
Pτ is the net rental price, per square foot. For the time being, take Vt as
given.12 Below we discuss two possible assumptions about how expectations
for Vt are set at time t − n, the time when the decision to build is made.
At−n is the area of the plot, Mt−n is the height of the building (in meters).
11The data set below contains several types of buildings, including oﬃces and apartment
buildings. In this model, without loss of generality, we do not distinguish among the type
of the building.
12For the sake of simplicity we assume that each ﬂoor as the same value. In truth rents
are higher in higher ﬂoors, but here we can consider Vt to be the average rent per ﬂoor.
16Ct−n measures the cost of construction. Finally Lt−n i st h es q u a r ef o o tc o s t
of acquiring the land.13
A developer will start reaping returns at time t f o rd e c i s i o n sm a d ea tt i m e
t−n, since there is a lag between the decision to build and when the building
can start collecting rent. We assume, ina c c o r d a n c ew i t hC l a r ka n dK i n g s t o n
(1930), Picken and Ilozor (2003) and Sabbagh (1989), that building costs
are quadratic with respect to height per square foot. This proﬁtf u n c t i o n
represents that fact that for a given plot size, the costs to building higher
have increasing marginal costs, due to increased cost of elevators, HVAC
systems, wind bracing and foundation preparation. The function also reﬂects
that fact that a ﬂat, bulky building is generally cheaper to build than a tall,
narrow building of the same volume.
G i v e ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) ,t h eﬁrst order condition with respect to Mt−n yields
a decision about the optimal height, which is a function of the value of the












assuming that proﬁts are greater than or equal to zero.
Next, we assume the standard zero proﬁt condition for the value of land:
the landowner will charge the developer a price for land such that there are
no economic proﬁts. If we set the proﬁt equation (eq. 1) equal to zero, plug
in equation (2) and solve for Lt−n w eg e tt h ep e r - s q u a r e - f o o tv a l u eo fl a n d ,
which is based on the value of the building and the costs of building, as well













Furthermore, we assume that the supply of plots that are available to
developers to build on is a function of the value of the land at each period:
Nt−n = γ0 (Lt−n)
γ1 . (3)
We can then plug this equation into equation (3) get an equation for
the number of skyscraper starts as a function of the costs and beneﬁts of
13In this paper we assume A is exogenous. We discuss this empirical implications of this
assumption in more detail in section 5 below. In addition, we assume the developer builds












In terms of the market for building space, we assume, as in Wheaton







where Dt is the quantity of space demanded, and Et is the exogenously
determined level of oﬃce employment.
Next we assume, similar to Wheaton (1999), that the short run supply
(i.e., the current building stock at time t),S t is ﬁx e ds ot h a tt h ep r i c ei ss e t






Since we do not have data for rent, equation (5) plays an important
part in the analysis, since we will use building stock, employment and other
demand variables to proxy for building rents. We do not directly incorporate
vacancy into the model. In the empirical models below, however, we do
include vacancy rates for several years, and ﬁnd that, controlling for the
other variables that determine skyscraper completions and height, vacancy
is relatively unimportant.
In summary, equation (3) assumes that the supply of lots on the market
is determined by the price of land, and the price of land is determined by
the value of the building. This model generates two equations: the optimal
number of completions and the optimal height, as a function of building value
and costs. Building value is determined by the demand for oﬃce space and
the nature of expectations about future demand.
4.1 Myopic Expectations
Following the literature on the calculation of building values, we can assume
that expectations of the building value are based on myopic or rational expec-
tations (Wheaton, 1999). Under myopic expectations we have future prices
14Without loss of generality, we simplify the model by having one variables that de-
termines the quantity demanded and one that shifts demand. To reﬂect the particular
characteristics of New York City, we expand upon this list in the empirical sections below.
18determined simply by the discounted value of the net rental price at time
t − n:
Vt = Pt−n/rt−n, (6)
where rt−n is the current real discount rate. Plugging in equation (6) into









































Since we have data on the number of completions, we assume that the number
of completions is equal to the number of starts Nt = Nt−n,a n dMt = Mt−n.15
These two equations are linear in log-log form.16
4.2 Rational Expectations
In this section we explore the dynamics of skyscrapers under the assumption
of rational expectations. For simplicity we now deal with the log versions
of variables, which gives us linear equations to work with (where logged
variables are in lower case):
mt =l n ( 1 /2) + vt − ct−n +2 at−n
lt−n =l n ( 1 /4) + 2vt − ct−n +2 at−n
nt = γ0 + γ1lt−n
pt = α0 − α1st + α2et
15Clearly, the number of completions can be less than the number of starts, but given
the large costs of development, the irreversible nature of many construction-related deci-
sions, and based on the fact that many building completions occur well into an economic
downturn, this assumption appears to be valid.
16Since the real interest rate can be negative, we leave it in levels in the regressions
below.
19Rational Expectations models have the developers making forecasts about







pt and Et−n [·] is the conditional expectations operator given
all available information at time t − n. Under the assumption of rational
expectations: (1) agents do not make systematic mistakes in estimating future
returns, (2) they use available knowledge of the relevant stochastic processes
to make unbiased forecasts, and (3) the economic model and the forecasting
model used by the developer are the same (Clayton, 1996).





, if we assume no bubbles (i.e., limt→∞ λ
tpt =






where Et−npt+i is the expected net rental price at time t+i given all available
information at time t − n.
Rents, however, are generally assumed to have a unit root, therefore the
ﬁrst diﬀerences of the rent is best described via an AR(q):
φ(L)∆pt = μt,
φ(L)=1 − φ1L − φ2L
2 − ... − φqL
q,
where μt white noise.
As Clayton (1996) discusses, the Hansen-Sargent (1982) formula allows
equation (7) to be expressed as a function of the AR(q) process, since the
autoregression function can be used to forecast future rents. However, since
Et−n∆pt 6= ∆Et−npt, we must make some modiﬁcations to the Hansen-
Sargent formula, which are discussed in Clayton (1996), and are based on a
derivation given in Finn (1986). In short, we can write the expected change




























204.3 Time Varying Discount Rate
Equation (8) above gives a functional form for the change in the value of the
building. However, this functional form emerges based on the assumption
of a constant discount rate. Given the data, though, we have reason to
believe the real interest rate varies over time (as will be demonstrated in the
















1+rj. As discussed in Clayton (1996) an approximately linear












where ρj,j=1 ,2,3 are model parameters, and ρi
3 < 1. If ∆rt follows an
autoregressive process of order q0 such that θ(L)∆rt = μr

















































Since we do not have rent data, but rather the variables that determine
rent, we have
∆pt = −α1∆st + α2∆et.
The proper lag lengths for the building stock, demand variables and interest
rates are discussed in the empirical section below. Given the equation for
rents, we can then plug this into the completions and height equations. In
short, we can now estimate now estimate the following model given by the
assumption of rational expectations:
∆nt =2 γ1 [−ψ1 (L)∆st−n + ψ2 (L)∆et−n − ψ3 (L)∆rt−n]−γ1∆ct−n+ε
n
t (10)
∆mt = ψ1 (L)∆st−n+ψ2 (L)∆et−n−ψ3 (L)∆rt−n−∆ct−n+ε
m
t , (11)
21where ψi (L) are the reduced-form autoregression functions for the demand
and interest rate variables..
5 Empirical Results
In this section we empirically investigate the determinants of the number of
completions and the average height of these completions from 1895 to 2004.
Figure 1 shows the time series graphs over the period. The graph shows the
cyclical nature of both the number of completions and the heights themselves,
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# of Skyscraper Completions, 1895-2004
Figure 1: Time Series of number of skyscraper completions and their average
heights, 1895-2004. Source: Emporis.com.
The regressions below present results of more detailed equations than the
ones presented above. The aim of section 4 was to generate a framework
for the regressions. Because we use proxy variable for rents, and some of
these variables are national rather than local, and because some of the data
is not precisely the same as the model would specify, we do not attempt
to test restrictions imposed by the structural equations, since this does not
22appear to be a valid exercise. Rather, we shall compare the validity of the
myopic model to the rational expectations model based on the relationship
of the coeﬃcient estimates to their theoretical predictions, as well as the
goodness-of-ﬁt of the regressions themselves.
5.1 The Data
The models in section 4 above generate equations for both the number of
completions and the (average) height of completed buildings as a function of
the lags of several demand and supply variables. As discussed above in the
literature review, the number of completions has been shown in past works
to be strongly related to oﬃce employment variables, and other economic
variables such as GNP growth (see Wheaton (1999) and Kling and McCue
(1987), for example). This paper includes variables that relate directly to
the New York City economy, and which have not been explored elsewhere.
In many cases, time series variables that relate directly to New York City
do not exist annually for the entire sample period of 1895 to 2004; in these
cases, national variables are used; interestingly, as will be discussed below,
these variables are important determinants of skyscraper development in New
York City. This is true for several reasons. One is that while some variables,
like interest rates and inﬂation, may show regional diﬀerences, the variation
across regions tends to be less than their co-movements with the national
average; using national measures is a good proxy for the local variables. In
addition, since New York City is arguably the most important city in the
national economy, it clearly aﬀects and is aﬀected by the national trends,
and, therefore, national variables can be important variables for New York
City.
In addition, some variables that exist at the New York City level are not
the ideal. For example, the population of the New York City metropolitan
area is clearly an important determinant of the demand for building space.
The New York City regional population has become more decentralized over
the course of the 20th century and thus looking at the NYC area population
is important. While annual data exists for the NYC population, annual data
for surrounding jurisdictions do not appear to exist (or is not accessible),
as a result, decennial census data are used for the population of New York
City and three counties in New York that supply a large fraction of workers
23and visitors: Nassau, Suﬀolk and Westchester.17 Annual data is generated by
estimating the annual population via the formula popi,t = popi,t−1eβi, where
i is the census year, i.e., i ∈ {1890,1900,...,2000},tis the year, and βi is
solved from the formula, popi = popi−1e10∗βi. For the years 2001 to 2004, the
same growth rate from the 1990’s is used.
Ideally, we would like to get a true measure of the market value of the
land in Manhattan. Since this is not feasible, this paper uses a proxy variable:
the equalized assessed value of land in Manhattan. The advantages of this
variable are that every block and lot in Manhattan has been assessed and
reassessed every year since the late 18th century; and this is a comprehensive
and systematic measure. Every year, New York State issues “equalization
values” for each jurisdiction in New York State as a way to equalize the
assessment values across the state. In other words, New York State derives
the equalization factor to convert all assessed values to market values, so that
land values then are comparable across that state.18
In addition, clearly there has been technological innovation and improve-
ments in building materials and methods over the 20th century. However,
w ed on o th a v ead i r e c tm e a s u r eo ft e c hnological change. Rather we use
an index of real construction costs, which, at least implicitly, measures the
eﬀect of technological change, since there have been extended periods over
the sample period where real building costs have fallen.19
The Variables Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the data
used in the time series regressions. In general, we have data for 115 years,
1890 to 2004. The dependent variables are observed from 1895 to 2004; ad-
ditional years of data were acquired for the lags of the independent variables.
F o rd a t aa b o u tt h eb u i l d i n g s ,w eh a v et h en u m b e ro fc o m p l e t i o n se a c hy e a r
17New York City population data is used in one of the regressions presented and is
discussed below. Note that New York City before 1898 was just Manhattan and Staten
Island, but the population of the other boroughs are included in 1890.
18“An equalization rate is a ratio of the locally determined assessed value of taxable real
property to the Oﬃce of Real Property Oﬃce’s estimate of market value. Equalization
rates are New York State’s independent measure of each municipality’s level of assessment.
For example, an equalization rate of 50 indicates that a town’s total assessed value of all
real property is 50% of the town’s full (market) value determined for a speciﬁed date.”
(http://www.nysegov.com/citGuide.cfm, 2006)
19For example, the index of real construction costs used here peaked in 1979. Between
1979 and 2003, real constructions costs fell 15%. In 2003, the index was roughly the same
value as it was in 1947.
24and the average of height of the completions.20 The appendix gives details
on how these variables were constructed. As a measure of the total building
stock we use the net cumulative number of completed skyscrapers for each
year. That is to say, the measure of total stock is the cumulative number of
completions, with the number of destructions or demolitions removed in the
year of the demolition or destruction. We also include the average area of
the plots for the completed buildings.
For oﬃce employment we use the proportion of total national employment
that is in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate industries (F.I.R.E./Emp.)
(New York City level employment data has not been collected over the sample
period). To measure the cost of building we have an index of real construction
material costs (nominal building material cost index divided by the GDP
deﬂator). In addition, we also have the annual growth rate of real estate
loans provided by commercial banks. This variable is designed to measure
the access that developers have to capital for building. To measure the
discount rate we use the real interest rate on commercial paper, which is the
commercial paper rate minus the current inﬂation rate, as determined by the
GDP deﬂator. Also, as mentioned above, the New York city metropolitan
area population is measured from census data.
To measure the health of the New York economy, as well as the demand
f o rb u i l d i n gs p a c e ,w eu s ev a r i a b l e st h a tr e l a t et os t o c km a r k e t si nN e wY o r k :
the average daily volume of stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the year-to-year change in the log of Dow Jones Industrial
Index, as a measure of the stock market returns. NYSE volume is a measure
of the income available from stock trading.
For taxes, subsidies and zoning policy, we include four variables. First
we include the real estate tax rate (per $100 assessed value). Next, in terms
of zoning, we include a dummy variable that takes on a value of one in years
1916 to 2004 to account for the presence of zoning regulations. In addition,
we include a “Westside zoning” dummy variable that takes on the value
of one in the years 1982 to 1988. In these years, builders were given FAR
bonuses to give builder the incentive to construct oﬃce space on the Westside
of Manhattan’s midtown business district. In terms of building subsidies, we
include a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the years 1977 to
20Note that, without loss of generality, we do not distinguish among uses for the build-
ings. Roughly 63% of the buildings are oﬃces, the remaining 37% are residential, hotels
or mixed use. Barr (2007) investigates how use aﬀects height.
251992, to measure the eﬀect of the business subsidies oﬀered in those years.
Lastly, we include a “421-a” dummy variable that takes on a value of one in
years 1971 to 1985 to reﬂect the relative generous residential subsidies oﬀered
in this period.
Finally, the variable “economic volatility” was a derived variable designed
to measure the volatility of building values. The variable is derived from eight
variables that measure the health of the New York City Economy.21 Each
of the variables was normalized by subtracting its mean and dividing by the
standard deviation (i.e., turned into a z-score). The four “bad” variables were
then made negative, and all the z-scores were added together to create an
economic activity index. The mean of this index is 0.0015 and the standard
deviation is 3.11. Thus any value above zero indicates a robust New York
City economy; anything below is a weak one. The volatility measure was
derived by taking the standard deviation of the economic index for each year
and the prior two years. Thus the volatility variable is a type of moving
average, designed to measure the average variation in economic activity and
hence building values for a three-year period.
In this study we assume that plot size is a randomly determined, exoge-
nous variable. Builders, however, may seek out large plot sizes so they can
build tall buildings since it is more eﬃcient to build on larger plots. The
problem of endogeneity, however, cannot be investigated further here due
to the lack of instruments that are related to plot size but not height or
completions.
Investigation of the statistical properties of the average plot size time
series and the eﬀect of plot size on the other coeﬃcients indicates that the
assumption of exogeneity may not cause severe problems. First, the distribu-
tion of the log of average plot sizes appears to be log normal (the Jarque-Bera
statistic is 3.89, with a p-value of 0.14), second the time series does not show
autocorrelation across the whole sample, which would indicate that, in gen-
eral, there is not a strong cyclical component to plot size; there does appear
to be ﬁrst order autocorrelation for subsamples, but this ﬁnding is not ro-
bust across subsamples of various years and year lengths. In addition, when
21These variables are: (1) Nominal commercial paper rate, (2) the GDP Deﬂator In-
ﬂation rate, (3) the percent change in the Dow Jones Industrial Index, (4) the percent
change in the New York Stock Exchange trading volume, (5) the New York City property
tax rate, (6) the ratio of national F.I.R.E. employment to total employment, (7) the na-
tional unemployment rate, and (8) the growth int h ee q u a l i z e da s s e s s e dv a l u e so fl a n di n
Manhattan. The descriptive statistics of these variables are given below.
26t h ep l o ts i z ev a r i a b l ei so m i t t e d ,t h e r ei sn os y s t e m a t i cc h a n g ei nt h eo t h e r
coeﬃcient estimates.
{Table 2 here}
5.2 Regression Results of The Myopic Model
A st h em o d e l sa b o v ed e m o n s t r a t e ,t h el a g so fm a n yv a r i a b l e sa r ei m p o r t a n t
determinants of skyscrapers completions and heights. However, discovering
the correct lag structure for each equation requires a bit of experimentation.
As prior studies have discussed (e.g., Wheaton, 1999) and as the data for this
project indicate, building a skyscraper can take several years. Starting with
lag lengths of ﬁve years prior to completion, regression results were compared
to other regressions with diﬀerent lag lengths to see which equations had
the best overall ﬁt, in terms of adjusted-R2. In the end, lag lengths for the
equations varied between one and four years. In general, those variables that
related to the demand for building space had shorter lag lengths than those
that related to ﬁnancing, which makes sense given that builders must ﬁrst
secure ﬁnancing before beginning construction.
Hypotheses To Test The model presented in section 4 generates a
few hypotheses to test. The model was simpliﬁed for ease of exposition, but
the empirical model includes several other variables that relate to the supply
or demand of the height and completions equations. First, we would expect
oﬃce employment to be positively related to building height and completions.
As additional measures of demand we include a measure of the New York City
metropolitan area population, the average daily trading volume on the New
York stock exchange and the return on the Dow Jones Industrial average;
we would also expect these to have positive coeﬃcients. In terms of the
supply side, we have interest rates, a measure of the total building supply,
the presences of zoning rules, and a measure of the access to building capital.
We would expect all but the last one to be negative, while access to capital
should be positive. The tax rate should be negative, as it increases the cost
of a maintaining a building.
I nt e r m so fw h a tm i g h tb et h o u g h to fa sd i r e c tg o v e r n m e n ta c t i o n s ,w e
have a dummy variable for the years Westside zoning plan was in eﬀect,
which was to encourage development on the Western part of midtown Man-
hattan, but also put sunlight regulations in place; we would expect a positive
27coeﬃcient on this plan for the number of completions since it provided FAR
bonuses, but we cannot determine the eﬀect on height per se. On one hand
the FAR bonus may be used for additional height, but if the sunlight reg-
ulations place additional costs on that height, the FAR bonus may be use
for bulkier but relatively shorter buildings. In addition we include dummy
variables for the years that the 421-a and ICIP programs were the most gen-
erous (the beneﬁts of these were later curtailed). We would expect these
three variables to also be positive since they lowered the cost of building, by
providing tax abatements.
Finally, we include the volatility measure to see if it aﬀects the option
value of holding land. Given the theory discussed in section 3.2, we hypoth-
esize a negative eﬀect of uncertainty for completions, but perhaps no eﬀect
on height, since once a builder begins the project, the option to build has
been exercised.
5.2.1 Number of Completions
Table 3 presents the regressions for the number of completions. The depen-
dant variable is the log of one plus the number of completions.22 In general
these regressions show a good ﬁt to the data, and, the coeﬃcients show the
expected signs. Table 3 presents three diﬀerent models. Equation (1) looks
at the determinants of completions with only the basic supply and demand
variables (and the zoning dummy variable) to explore the role that just mar-
ket factors play in skyscraper cycles; equation (2) expands this equation to
include the average plot size; and equation (3) is the “full” equation that
also includes the eﬀects of volatility, post-War policy changes and property
tax rates. The regressions had positive ﬁrst-order serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity; Newey-West standard errors were calculated.
We can see that the two-year lag of national F.I.R.E employment is an
important determinant of the number of completions; the proxy for total
building stock also shows a strong negative relationship with completions.
Real construction costs are also statistically signiﬁcant and negative. The
eﬀect of the metropolitan area population is also positive and large. These
all concord with the theory provided by the model. Notice, too, that the
variables that relate to project ﬁnancing and the decision to build give the
best ﬁt when they are lagged three or four years before completion; those
22For simplicity, we show the results of OLS regressions rather than Poisson regressions.
T h er e s u l t sa r eq u i t es i m i l a r .
28variables that relate to demand and construction costs have the best ﬁtt w o
years prior to completion.
Since the regressions are in log-log form, we can interpret the coeﬃcients
as elasticities. For example, we see that both demand and supply variables
are relatively elastic. Most notably oﬃce employment, and population on
the demand side, and construction costs and access to loans on the supply
side.
The coeﬃcient on the zoning variable (=1if after 1915, 0 otherwise)
is negative, as would be predicted, but, interestingly, it is not statistically
signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations. The eﬀect of zoning would be to presumably
make buildings less tall, on average, and would therefore lower completions
of very tall buildings. The coeﬃcients show, however this eﬀect appears to
be relatively large, decreasing completions by 18%. An F-test comparing
separate zoning dummy variables for the 1916 and 1961 zoning regulations,
respectively, did not show statically signiﬁcant diﬀerences and thus only one
dummy variable was included.
The real interest rate appears to be a relatively unimportant determinant
of the number of completions; the coeﬃcient is quite small in magnitude; and
generally not statistically signiﬁcant. This result concords with the early
work of Long (1936) and more recently with McGough and Tsolacos (1999).
The real interest rate maybe relatively unimportant, in part, because New
York builders often have access to foreign sources of capital, from such places
as Japan, for example (See Quint, 1990). As a result, a high interest rate
may cause builders to seek relatively less costly capital sources abroad. In
addition, as the coeﬃcient on the change in real estate loans indicates, access
to capital appears to be relatively more important than the cost of this
capital, all else equal.23 Finally, total volatility does appear to be a negative
determinant of completions, as would accord with the ﬁndings in the options
literature, and Holland, et al. (2002).
{Table 3 here}
5.2.2 Height
Table 4 presents the height equation results. Because for some years there
w e r en oc o m p l e t i o n so fs k y s c r a p e r s ,w ed on o th a v eo b s e r v a t i o n sf o rt h ea v e r -
23Note that the inclusion or exclusion of ∆ln(R.E. Loans) from the equation does not
materially aﬀect the other coeﬃcients, including the interest rate.
29age height for those years. Equation (1) and (2) are the results of regressions
where each observation was weighted by multiplying it by the square root of
the proportion of completions in that year, which can be appropriate when
dealing with variables are that are averages (and this also has the eﬀect of
removing the years for which no observations exist). Equations (3) and (4)
are produced by ordinary least squares, but with the inclusion of a dummy
variable for the years in which their were no completions. Note that the
presence of the dummy variable inﬂates the value of R2.24
In terms of lag lengths we see that the demand variables have the best
ﬁt with lags of one or two; while the “decision to supply” variables have
optimal lags of two or three years. That the lag structure is a bit diﬀerent
for the height equation as compared to the completions equation is most
likely due to the fact that height adjustments can be made during the course
of the project, though not without some costs to the builders. As a result if
costs are relatively high, then the coeﬃcient for that variable indicates, the
decision to shorten the building can be made, on average, one year before
completion.
Across equations we see that F.I.R.E. employment does not appear to
be strongly related to height. Total stock appears to be a slight negative
determinant of total height. The presences of zoning laws, appears to have
reduced building heights by a large percentage, around 18%. Construction
costs determine height, with a negative eﬀe c ta sp r e d i c t e d ,b u tt h ec o e ﬃcient
is relatively inelastic. Though stock exchange volume is positive and signif-
icant, the return on the Dow Jones Index does not appear to aﬀect height.
Both the New York City area population and the NY stock exchange volume
positively aﬀect building height.
Similar to the completions equations, interest rates do not strongly de-
termine height, and as expected the average plot size is an important de-
terminant of average height across years. The tax rate is also a negative
determinant of height. Unlike the completions equations, however, volatility
does not appear to aﬀect the building height. Lastly, the government pol-
icy variables do appear to have modestly aﬀected building height over the
y e a r s .T h eW e s t s i d ez o n i n gc o e ﬃcient is negative, which appears to be be-
cause of the sunlight provisions in the zoning code amendment (though it is
24In addition, a Heckman selection model was run, but the coeﬃcient for the Mills ratio
was found to be statistically insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient estimates were generally
close to the results of the OLS model with the dummy variable; as a result the Heckman
regression results are not presented.
30not statistically signiﬁcant). The ICIP program appears to have provided an
incentive for corporations to build taller; while the 421-a program appears
to have, at most, a modest eﬀect on building height.
{Table 4 here}
5.2.3 Additional Models
Here we present the results of additional econometric models.25 Table 5
presents regressions for the number of completions. Equation (1) and (2) are
for pre-WWII (1895-1945 and post-WWII (1946-2004), respectively. Inter-
estingly, a Chow test for diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients shows does not reject
the null hypothesis of no diﬀerences across the two periods (F −stat =0 .66,
p − val =0 .82). This would indicate that, fundamentally, the causes of the
building cycles have not changed over the course of the 20th century. Equa-
tion (3) presents regressions that includes the vacancy rate, which was not
obtainable for the full sample period. Interestingly, vacancy does not appear
to aﬀect the number of completions.
{Table 5 here}
Table 6 presents the results for the height equations. As with the regres-
sions in Table 5, a Chow test does not show any structural break after World
War II; though the F-stat is close to rejecting the null (F − stat =1 .28,
p − val. =0 .13) In equation (3), the vacancy rate is statistically signiﬁcant
and has a negative coeﬃcient, though the eﬀect of vacancy is quite small,
all else equal. Equation (2), shows that in the post-war period, F.I.R.E em-
ployment, building costs and interest rates appear to have become relatively
more important in determining height.
{Table 6 here}
25In addition to regressions presented in this section, a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) was performed using a completions equation (Table 3 equation (4)), and a height
equation (Table 4, equation (3)). The correlation of residuals was 0.114; a Breusch-Pagan
test on the correlation of the residuals did not reject the null of uncorrelated errors.
Therefore we don’t present the SUR results. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient estimates were
quite similar to the results shown above.
315.2.4 Land Values
Every year since late 18th century, New York City has given assessed val-
uations for every lot and block in the city for both the land and the im-
provements. Here we investigate the role that land values play in building
height and completions. Given our assumption about the relationship be-
tween the number of completions and the value of land, we can test a version
of this equation. To do this, we perform two-stage least squares. The ﬁrst
stage regresses the growth of equalized land value on the variables that af-
fect both the demand and supply of building space. The right hand side of
this equation is very similar to the ones presented above, with the following
diﬀerences. First, we estimate land values based on the diﬀerences and levels
of contemporaneous values of the right hand side variables on the assump-
tions that land is assessed based on current market values, which are based
on current economic conditions. Secondly we include the population growth
of both New York city in addition to the population of the Metropolitan
area. We look at the growth of land values, rather than the levels, because
of the presences of unit roots in the dependent variable and as some of the
independent ones. The results are presented in table 7.
{Table 7 here}
First we can see that the growth in the land value measure is an impor-
tant determinant of both building completions and height (controlling for
plot size). However, we can see that this variable alone cannot account for as
much of the variation in the dependent variables as the disaggregated equa-
tions above. Second, the growth equalized land value equation has most of
the signs we would expect. Total stock is positively related to assessed values
which is presumably due to increased economic activity that these buildings
house. Land value has a negative relationship with building costs. The
presence of zoning laws does not appear to have aﬀected land value growth.
The Westside Zoning and ICIP dummies are positive and signiﬁcant, while
the 421-a dummy is negative and signiﬁcant. The incentives for businesses
apparently have provided increased land value growth, while the incentives
for apartment buildings have apparently decreased land value growth. Inter-
estingly Relative F.I.R.E growth and population growth seem unimportant
determinants of land value growth.
325.3 Regression Results of the Rational Expectations
Model
As discussed above, rational expectations models assume that agents use
all available information about the stochastic processes driving the future
rents. Furthermore, it is assumed that agents know and use the economic
model to forecast the value of buildings (Sheﬀrin, 1996). In order to do time-
series forecasting, the variables must be made covariance-stationary, which is
generally done by diﬀerencing. Next, the proper lags lengths of the variables
must be discovered, by Box-Jenkins methods, for example. In the data set
here, we do not have observations on rents, but rather we use economic
variables that determine rents, such as employment and total building stock.
When implementing the rational expectations model here two caveats are
in order. First, the data used is often national (macro) in scope or imperfectly
measured, but, nonetheless, we use this data to infer the nature of micro-level,
Manhattan-speciﬁc expectations formation. Second, despite the potential
limitations of the data, a test of the rational expectations model here is a
test of both model itself as well as the nature of expectations. Rejection of
the model does not necessarily mean that agents are not following rational
expectations, but rather may not be using the same model or data presented
in this paper. To compare the models, we look at their predictive power and
the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients.
5.3.1 Unit Root Tests
Table 8 presents the results of the unit root tests. As can be seen from the
table, several of the variables have unit roots in their levels.
{Table 8 here}
Next the appropriate lag lengths of the diﬀe r e n c e so ft h ev a r i a b l ew e r ed e -
termined in the following manner. First the graphs of the partial autocorrela-
tion functions (PAC) were used to determine the approximate lag lengths.26
Next autoregressive function regressions were run based on the PACs; the
residuals were tested serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Cor-
relation LM Test. In all cases, but one, there was no serial correlation.
26We assume that the number of completions and the average heights do not Granger
cause the independent variables.
33The one variable that exhibited serial correlation was ∆ln(F.I.R.E./Emp.).
Adding additional lags beyond that suggested by the PAC, severely reduced
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and did not remove the serial corre-
lation. Tests were also run to check for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard
errors were used in the time series because of the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. As the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate ﬁrst-order serial correlation
is generally not a problem. Table 9 presents the lag lengths for the demand-
related variables.
{Table 9 here}
Generally the variables have lag lengths of one to three, except, interest-
ingly ∆(∆lnDJI) has a relatively long lag length of six. Notice that instead
of using the diﬀerences in the cumulative number we use the log of number
of completions in a given year.
5.3.2 Regression Results for Completions
Here run a regression based on equation (10). Table 10 presents three diﬀer-
ent equations. Equation (1) includes all of the demand variables and their
lags, the supply variables and real interest rate and its lags; also included
is a measure of the average plot size in the following way. The change in
plot size is multiplied by a dummy variable, that takes on a zero if there
was no completion in the year prior and one if there was. Thus the plot size
variable is interacted with a dummy variable that accounts for the whether
there is an observation or not. Equation (2) includes only the years in which
changes in plot size variable was obtainable. Finally equation (3) represents
a parsimonious version of the model. That is to say, the non-statistically sig-
niﬁcant lags were omitted, and then optimal lag lengths were selected based
on adjusted-R2.27
In general, looking at the statistical signiﬁcance of the demand coeﬃ-
cients, we see that many of the lags of the demand variables are statistically
insigniﬁcant, which would suggest they are not used to forecast building
value. For example, of the four lags for the oﬃce employment measure, none
is statistically signiﬁcant. In general the coeﬃcients have the expected signs,
especially the cost side of the equation.
27Note that the dummy variables for zoning, Westsidezoning, ICIP and 421−a were
omitted, as they were not statistically signiﬁcant.
34If we compare equation (3) to equations (1), for example, we see that
equation (3) provides generally the same ﬁt, as measured by ¯ R2. This would
suggest that the rational expectations model is not consistent with the actual
behavior of agents. In addition, in section below we see that the rational ex-
pectations has far larger prediction errors as compared to the myopic model.
{Table 10 here}
The Average Height Table 11 presents regression results of the reduced
form equation (11). Here we present the results of two regressions. Equation
(1) presents the regression for all the years for which we can calculate the
growth in height. Equation (2) is the parsimonious version of equation (1).
In general, a similar over-all conclusion for the height equation can be made
as for the completions equations: the rational expectations model does not
appear to be a very good ﬁt of the data. The overwhelming majority of
the coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant, and the parsimonious model
provides roughly the same ﬁt (in terms of ¯ R2).
In terms of the coeﬃcients, we see only one statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
from the oﬃce employment measure, and none for the population. We do
see a positive eﬀect from interest rates cost growth. This further suggests




In assessing the validity of the two models, we need to look at how well
they predict the completions and height cycles. In Figure 2, we present
the predictions made by the myopic model (Table 3, equation (3)) and the
rational expectations model for completions (Table 10, equation (1)).28 As
can be seen from the graph, the myopic model does a good job of tracking
the major skyscraper building cycles. The rational expectations model does a
poor job, signiﬁcantly over-predicting the number of completions. Also note
that we present the variables in their log form. If we looked at the actual
28The predicted values from the rational expectations model are generate by d lnyt =
d lnyt−1 + d ∆lnyt, d lny0 =0
35number of completions versus the predictions, there would be a much greater
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Figure 2: Actual completions and predicted completions, 1900-2004.
In Figure 3, we look at the height predictions for the years 1949 to 1996,
because in this period there was at least one completion in every year. Again,
we see the rational expectations model does not track the actual heights. The
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Figure 3: Prediction of height versus actual heights (in logs), 1949-1996.
366C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented an econometric analysis of the determinants of
skyscraper construction and height cycles in Manhattan from 1895-2004. We
presented a simple model for the market for tall buildings under the assump-
tions of both myopic and rational expectations. These models provide a
framework for the regressions. We then estimate completions and the av-
erage height using several local and national variables that determine the
demand and supply for space and height. Regressions for the two models
indicate that the myopic model provides a better ﬁt of the data as com-
pared to the rational expectations model. This ﬁnding is consistent with
other work on commercial and residential construction, due to the long lag
time between conception and completions, as well as the semi-irreversibility
of these projects. Rejection of the rational expectations model, however, is
does mean builders don’t follow rational expectations, but rather we don’t
ﬁnd rational expectation here based on the model or the included variables.
An investigation of the optimal lag structure shows that for completions
variables that relate to building ﬁnancing such as interest rates and access to
capital have three or four year lags, while those variables that relate to the
demand for building space and the construction of the building have optimal
lags of two years prior to completion. For height, all variables have optimal
lags of one or two years prior to completion.
Furthermore, we measure the elasticity of the variables with respect to
completions and height. We ﬁnd that the elasticity of completions with
respect to the national employment in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
(F.I.R.E.) sector is relatively elastic, as is building costs. In addition, we
look at the eﬀect of three speciﬁcg o v e r n m e n tp r o g r a m st h a to ﬀered building
incentives (via dummy variables for those periods): the “Westside zoning”
rules, the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program (ICIP), and the
“421-a” housing tax abatement program. We ﬁnd that they generally have
increased the number of completions, but have had mixed-eﬀects on height.
The sunlight provision of the Westside zoning rules was negative, while the
ICIP apparently gave builders the incentive to go taller. The 421-a program
does not to appear to have an eﬀect on height.
Interest rates appear to play a relatively minor role in determining com-
pletions, while the eﬀects of zoning on completions is negative and large, but
is not statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient measures a decline in tall build-
ing completions by around 18%, which is roughly the same magnitude for the
37reduction of average height (i.e., average height has decreased by about 18%
because of zoning regulations). Property tax rates also negatively determine
completions and heights.
Comparing regressions for the pre-World War II period to the post-War
period show that they capture roughly the same amount of variation across
years; however, in the post-War period, completions have become more sen-
sitive to costs, total stock, and the eﬀect of the NYC area population growth.
While height has become more aﬀected by relative F.I.R.E employment, as
well as building costs and access to capital. Additional regressions demon-
strate the importance of Manhattan land value growth for skyscraper devel-
opment.
As would be expected, there are periods where the predictions for both
height and completions do not perfectly match the actual numbers. This is
especially true at the peaks of the cycles, where the regressions under-predict
the number of completions. Perhaps the unaccounted for portion of the peaks
is due to the emergence of an “irrational exuberance” or the development of
conspicuous production competitions that have developed among builders
(especially in the 1920s). We leave these non-economic factors for future
study.
38A Appendix: Data Sources and Preparation
The data in the paper comes from several diﬀe r e n ts o u r c e s .H e r ew ed e s c r i b et h e
mains sources and features of the data. The ﬁrst source of data comes from the
website of Emporis (emporis.com), an international real estate consulting ﬁrm.
Their website lists 473 the buildings in New York City that are 100 meters or
taller and the years of their completion.29 These buildings could be of any type,
including for oﬃce, apartment, and other uses.
This data was then used to generate the number of completions and the average
height of the completions for each year from 1895 to 2005. Emporis.com also lists
if the building was destroyed or demolished. The year of destruction or demolition
was located by searching the historical volumes of the New York Times.
For the national economic variables such as building material construction costs
and interest rates, the main sources were generally from the volume, Historical
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (1976) and several U.S.
government websites such as BEA.gov and BLS.gov. In short, variables from
the Historical Statistics were combined with the more recent downloaded data.
Methods for combing the same variable from diﬀerent sources are described below
for each particular variable.
The New York City and building variables came from several diﬀerent sources.
For each of the 473 buildings in the database, the square footage of the plot was ob-
tained from one of three diﬀerent sources. For the vast majority of these cases, plot
size was obtained from either the Directory of Manhattan Oﬃce Buildings (Ballard,
1977), its web-based oﬀspring, mroﬃcespace.com, or the New York City’s web-
based G.I.S database called the New York City Map Portal (http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/mp/Portal.do).
In some rare cases, information on the lot size has to be obtained by viewing the
original certiﬁcates of occupancy for the buildings, which listed the frontage and
depth of plot. PDF versions of the certiﬁcates can be viewed via the NYC Dept.
of Buildings’ web-based Building Information System.
29A few caveats are in order. I have every reason to believe the list is very close
to complete. Since this is the only list of its kind there is no ability to cross check
it. However, given the data collection for this paper and for Barr (2007), and due
to the apparent thoroughness of Emporis’ data collection process, the list appears
to be quite close to complete, if not 100% so.
Secondly, clearly there can be some debate about what constitute the year of
completion; and in this regard there is some discrepancies with other sources, such
as New York City’s web-based G.I.S. database. However, it was felt best to use the
Emporis’ year for the sake of consistency and because Emporis is a for-proﬁt ﬁrm
and, presumably, has a vested interest in culling the most accurate data possible.
39New York Stock Exchange volume data and Dow Jones Industrial Index data
were obtained from New York Stock Exchange and a Dow Jones company publica-
tion (Pierce, 1996) and www.yahoo.com. The total assessed valuation of land for
Manhattan was obtained from historical volumes on property taxes in Manhattan
and the NYC Department of Finance website.
In terms of population data, New York City’s Health Department has tabulated
population counts for New York City annually back into the early part of the 19th
century. However, data for the surrounding counties could not be obtained on
annual basis, therefore decennial census data was used, and annual population
ﬁgures were estimated based on the population change in each 10-year period.
Next we give speciﬁc details for each of the variables.
-Skyscraper Height, Year of Completions and Current Status (extant or not),
and Net Total Stock. The primary source is Emporis.com, which provides informa-
tion on the height, year of completion and status (demolished or not). From this
set of 473 buildings in Manhattan, I aggregated the data to generate the number of
completions per year, the average height of those completions for each year and the
total net cumulative number of completions. The year of demolition or destruction
was found from articles from the historical New York Times (proquest)
-Average plot size: Data on each building’s plot size comes from the NYC Map
Portal (http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/mp/Portal.do), Ballard (1978); http://www.mroﬃcespace.com/;
NYC Dept. of Buildings Building Information System,
http://a810-bisweb.nyc.gov/bisweb/bsqpm01.jsp.
-Real Construction Cost Index. For index of construction material costs: 1947-
2004: Bureau of Labor Statistics Series Id: WPUSOP2200 “Materials and Compo-
nents for Construction” (1982=100). 1890-1947: Table E46 “Building Materials”.
Historical Statistics (1926=100). To join the two series, the earlier series was mul-
tiplied by 0.12521, which is the ratio of the new series index to the old index in
1947. The Real Index was create by dividing the construction cost index by the
GDP Deﬂator for each year.
-Annual NYC Population: 1890-1959: Various annual reports of the NYC
Health Department. 1960-2004: NYC Department of Health website:
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/vs/2005sum.pdf
-Inﬂation, 1890-2004: GDP Deﬂator, EH.net (2000=100)
-V a l u eo fR e a lE s t a t eL o a n s : 1896-1970: Table X591, “Real Estate Loans for
Commercial Banks.” 1972-2004: FDIC.gov Table CB12, “Real Estate Loans
FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks.” The two series were combined without any
adjustments. For 1890-1895: Values are generated by forecasting backwards based
on an AR(3) regression of the percent change in real estate loans from one year to
40the next.
-Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Employment (F.I.R.E)/Total Employ-
ment: 1900-1970: F.I.R.E data from Table D137, Historical Statistics. Total (Non
farm) Employment: Table D127, Historical Statistics. 1971-2004: F.I.R.E data
from BLS.gov Series Id: CEU5500000001 “Financial Activities.” Total Nonfarm
employment 1971-2004 from BLS.gov Series Id:CEU0000000001. The earlier and
later employment tables were joined by regressing overlapping years that were
available from both sources of the new employment number on the old employment
numbers and then correcting the new number using the OLS equation; this process
was also done with the F.I.R.E. data as well. 1890-1899: For both the F.I.R.E and
total employment, values were extrapolated backwards using the growth rates from
the decade 1900 to 1909, which was 4.1% for F.I.R.E and 3.1% for employment.
-Real Interest Rate (nominal rate minus inﬂation): Nominal interest rate:
1890-1970: Table X445 “Prime Commercial Paper 4-6 months.” Historical Stats.
1971-1997 http://www.federalreserve.gov, 1998-2004: 6 month CD rate. 6 month
CD rate was adjusted to a CP rate by regressing 34 years of overlapping data of
the CP rate on the CD rate and then using the predicted values for the CP rate
for 1997-2004. Inﬂation comes from the percentage change in the GDP deﬂator.
-Average Daily NYSE Traded Stock Volume: http://www.nyse.com/
-Dow Jones Industrial Index (closing value on last day of year): 1896-1932:
Pierce (1996); 1933 - 2004 from Yahoo.com, 1890-1895: Generated “backwards”from
predicted values based on a regression of the DJI on NYSE Volume, the year, and
total nonfarm employment, from 1896-1925.
-NYC Property Tax Rates (per $100 total assessed value): 1890-1975: Various
volumes of the NYC Tax Commission Reports. 1976-2004: NYC Dept. of Finance
website. Note that in 1983 tax rates became diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of property
usages. The rates used here are the ones for commercial property.
-Population NYC, Nassau, Suﬀolk, Westchester: 1890-2004: Decennial Census
on U.S. Population volumes. Annual data based on extrapolations, outlined in
text above.
- A s s e s s e dL a n dV a l u eM a n h a t t a n : Assessed Land Values: 1890-1975: Vari-
ous reports of NYC Tax Commission. 1975-2004 Real Estate Board of NY.
-Equalization Rate: 1890-1955: Various reports NYC Tax Commission. 1955-
2004: NY State Oﬃce of Real Property Services.
-Oﬃce Vacancy (1925-2005): 1925-1940: Armstrong and Hoyt (1941). 1941-
1959: Real Estate Board of New York Report (1968) 1960:-2002: Kelly (2002).
2002-2004: Real Estate Board of New York.
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45Descriptive Statististics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Manhattan Skyscraper Variables
Manhattan Skyscraper Completions 4.31 5.18 0.00 26.00 110
Avg. Height of Completions (meters) 143.36 25.29 100.0 224.60 87
Avg. Plot Size (sq. feet) 49,005 47,352 5,198 342,937 87
Net Total Cumulative # of Skyscrapers 169.99 142.94 1.00 464.00 110
National Economic Variables
Real Construction Costs Index 1.28 0.267 0.862 1.70 115
%I n ﬂation, GDP Deﬂator 2.46 4.47 -17.30 18.93 114
∆ ln(Value of Real Estate Loans) 0.08 0.073 -0.165 0.352 114
F.I.R.E /Total Employment 0.044 0.015 0.018 0.066 115
Economic Volatility 2.47 1.35 0.437 6.52 111
Real Interest Rate (%) 2.29 4.73 -13.86 23.92 114
NYC Economic Variables
Avg. daily NYSE Traded Stock Volume (M) 103.3 290.6 0.11 1456.7 115
∆ ln(Dow Jones Industrial Index) 0.04 0.214 -0.740 0.623 114
NYC Property Tax Rate (per $100 AV) 4.70 3.16 1.41 11.43 115
Population NYC (M) 6.49 1.83 1.61 8.13 115
Pop.: NYC, Nassau, Suﬀolk, Westchester (M) 8.43 2.79 2.74 11.90 115
Equalized Assessed Land Values, Manhattan (B) 12.50 19.08 1.01 74.07 115
∆ ln(Equalized Assd. Land Val., Mnhttn.) 0.038 0.075 -0.184 0.330 114
Equalization rate of AV 0.820 0.211 0.314 1.05 115
%O ﬃce Vacancy (1925-2004) 8.07 6.81 0.20 25.20 80
NYC Dummy Variables
Zoning Law Dummy (1916-2004) 0.774 115
“Westside” Zoning (1982-1988) 0.061 115
Indstl. & Comm. Incentive Prgrm. (1977-1992) 0.139 115
“421-a” (1971-1985) 0.130 115
Table 2: Time Series Descriptive Statistics. See Appendix for Sources.


























































Observations 110 110 107
R2 0.66 0.77 0.85
¯ R2 0.63 0.75 0.83
Durbin− Watson 1.61 .32 .0
Table 3: Absolute value of Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses.
∗signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.
47Dep.Var : ln(avg. height)

































































































Observations 87 86 110 109
R2 0.46 0.59 0.997 0.997
¯ R2 0.39 0.51 0.996 0.997
Durbin− Watson 1.41 .81 .51 .8
Table 4: Absolute value of Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses.∗signiﬁcant
at 10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. % Variables in each year
weighted by square root of number of completions; year with no completions
f o rd e p .v a r .w e r ed r o p p e d .
48ln(1 + number)








































































Observations 48 59 77
R2 0.87 0.78 0.84
¯ R2 0.82 0.71 0.80
Durbin− Watson 1.92 .52 .3
Table 5: Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ signiﬁcant
at10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
49ln(Avg. Height)
(1) (2) (3)
















































































Observations 50 59 78
R2 0.998 0.994 0.998
¯ R2 0.998 0.992 0.997
Durbin− Watson 2.02 .32 .2
Table 6: Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗ signiﬁcant at
10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
50ln(1 + num.) ln(height) ∆ln(Eq.LandValuet−2)
(1) (2) (3)%










































Observations 110 110 110
R2 0.56 0.997 0.51
¯ R2 0.55 0.996 0.43
Durbin-Watson 1.5
Table 7: Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗signiﬁcant at
10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. %First-stage regression for the
number of completions equation.
51Augmented Dickey-Fuller∗ (null hyp. is unit root)
Var |t-stat.| p-va.l Unit Root
ln(F.I.R.E/Emp.) 1.56 0.50 Yes
∆ln(Eq. Land Val.) 5.07 0.00
NYC Area Pop. .2.62 0.27 Yes
Ln(1+Num) 3.34 0.06
ln(NYSE Vol.) 1.18 0.91 Yes
ln(tax rate) 2.53 0.38 Yes
∆ln(dow) 9.29 0.00
ln(Height | num>0) 4.63 0.00
Table 8: ∗with constant and time trend, 1890-2004.
Time Series Variables
∆ln(FIRE ∆(∆lnDJI) ∆ln(Tax ∆(real ln(1+num) ∆ln(Pop.) ∆ln(NYSE




























t − 4 −0.495
(2.96)∗∗∗ −0.294
(2.89)∗∗∗
t − 5 −0.439
(3.05)∗∗∗
t − 6 −0.243
(2.2)∗∗
Obs. 110 107 110 109 110 109 110
R2 0.12 0.45 0.06 0.16 0.60 0.93
¯ R2 0.10 0.42 0.03 0.13 0.59 0.93
D.W. 1.62 .01 .92 .12 .12 .02 .2
Table 9: Autoregression functions for demend variables and real interest
rate. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗signiﬁcant at
10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.






















































































































∆ln(avg. plot size) 0.040
(0.6)










Observations 106 85 108
R2 0.50 0.43 0.40
¯ R2 0.35 0.19 0.33
Durbin-Watson 2.1 2.2 2.1
Table 10: Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗signiﬁcant at
10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.










































































¯ R2 0.37 0.39
Durbin Watson 2.2 2.1
Table 11: Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. ∗signiﬁcant at
10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.
54